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APPLYING WASHINGTON'S SENTENCING
REFORM ACT TO MANDATORY.LIFE
PRISONERS: AN EX POST FACTO
VIOLATION
Abstract Following the 1989 session of the Washington Legislature, the Indeterminate
Sentence Review Board (Board) began redetermining the minimum terms of prisoners
serving a mandatory life sentence for crimes committed before July 1984. To calculate
these new minimum terms, the legislature directed the Board to apply the same sentencing
ranges enacted in the Washington Sentencing Reform Act, which took effect July 1, 1984.
This Comment analyzes whether the state violated the United States Constitution when it
ordered that these minimum terms be redetermined. It concludes that Washington courts
should void the state's action because it violates the constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws.
Alan X. was convicted of first-degree murder in 1973.1 As required
by Washington law, the trial court sentenced Alan to a mandatory life
term. The parole statute, however, provided that Alan would be eligi-
ble for parole after serving a statutorily mandated minimum term of
twenty years, less time earned for good behavior.2 Based on this stat-
ute, the Board3 informed Alan that he would be eligible for parole
consideration in February 1990. In May 1989, the Washington Legis-
lature amended the parole statute for prisoners sentenced to a
mandatory life sentence.4 Based on the amended parole statute, the
Board informed Alan that he was not eligible for parole consideration
until 1996. By amending the parole statute, the state delayed by six
years Alan's opportunity to even be considered for parole. Alan's
question is simple: may the state do this?
The Sentencing Reform Act5 (SRA) changed Washington State's
sentencing system from an indeterminate sentencing system to a deter-
minate sentencing system.6 Whereas the indeterminate sentencing sys-
tem was designed to rehabilitate prisoners, the SRA is designed to
punish prisoners. Because the SRA applies only to crimes committed
1. Alan's story is adapted from a letter by a Washington State prisoner. Letter from prisoner
to Professor John Junker, University of Washington School of Law (Dec. 6, 1989) (on file with
the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter Prisoner's Letter].
2. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.95.115 (1988).
3. The Washington Legislature changed the name of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles
to the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board. Id § 9.95.001.
4. Substitute House Bill 1457, 51st Leg., Regular Sess., 1989 Wash. Laws 259 (codified at
WAH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9.95.009, .115 & .0011 (Supp. 1990)).
5. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.010-910 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
6. As opposed to an indeterminate sentencing system, a determinate system states the exact
number of years, months, and days of total confinement a prisoner will serve. Id. §
9.94A.030(10) (1988).
229
Washington Law Review
after June 1984,7 Washington State maintains the indeterminate sen-
tencing system to set the sentence length of prisoners who committed
crimes before the SRA's effective date.8
The Washington Legislature enacted section 9.95.009(2) 9 (the tran-
sition statute) to ensure that similarly situated prisoners under the two
sentencing systems would receive approximately the same prison sen-
tence.10 Before the enactment of Substitute House Bill (SHB) 1457,
the transition statute required the Board to set minimum terms' 2 and
parole release dates of certain non-mandatory prisoners' 3 reasonably
consistent with the purpose, scope and sentencing ranges of the
SRA.1'4 SHB 1457 amends the transition statute to require the Board
to set minimum terms for mandatory life prisoners.' 5 Unlike non-
mandatory prisoners, however, the legislature did not require the
Board to set the parole release dates of mandatory life prisoners rea-
sonably consistent with the SRA's sentencing standards.
This Comment analyzes whether the Washington Legislature vio-
lated the United States Constitution by requiring the Board to set the
minimum terms of mandatory life prisoners reasonably consistent with
the SRA sentencing ranges. Part I presents an overview of Washing-
ton State's two sentencing systems and includes a discussion of how
the Washington Supreme Court interpreted the transition statute.
Part II discusses how the United States Supreme Court and certain
circuit courts have analyzed whether a change in parole criteria vio-
lates the ex post facto prohibition. Part III explains why SHB 1457
violates the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. Finally, Part IV
concludes that the legislature should allow mandatory life prisoners to
serve their sentences as required by the parole statute in effect when
they committed their crimes.
7. Id. § 9.94A.905.
8. The Board estimates that the indeterminate system will apply to 950 prisoners as of
January 1991. TRANSFER STUDY COMM., WASHINGTON STATE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
REVIEW BD., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE app. D (1989) [hereinafter 1989 ISRB STUDY].
9. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.009(2) (1988 & Supp. 1990) (originally enacted as the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, 1981 Wash. Laws 137).
10. In re George, 52 Wash. App. 135, 143, 758 P.2d 13, 18 (1988) (citing In re Rolston, 46
Wash. App. 622, 625, 732 P.2d 166, 167-68 (1987)).
11. 51st Leg., Regular Sess., 1989 Wash. Laws 259 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.95.009, .115 & .0011 (Supp. 1990)).
12. The minimum term represents the time an indeterminate prisoner must serve before the
Board may consider the prisoner for parole. 1989 ISRB STUDY, supra note 8, at 8.
13. This Comment defines non-mandatory prisoners as all indeterminate prisoners except
those prisoners sentenced to a mandatory life sentence.
14. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.009(2) (1988).
15. Id. § 9.95.009(2) (Supp. 1990).
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I. OVERVIEW OF WASHINGTON STATE'S TWO
SENTENCING SYSTEMS
A. The Indeterminate Sentencing System
The Washington Legislature designed the indeterminate sentencing
system to rehabilitate prisoners. 16 This sentencing system assumed
that judges, social workers, and the Board could diagnose and cure the
causes of individual criminal behavior.'7 To accomplish this goal, the
legislature gave the Board broad discretion to determine the length of
a prisoner's sentence. 8 The legislature, however, prohibited the
Board from paroling prisoners unless they met certain minimum
requirements.
The legislature set different minimum requirements for non-
mandatory prisoners and mandatory life prisoners. The Board may
parole a non-mandatory prisoner if. (1) the prisoner has served the
minimum term,19 (2) the Board determines that the prisoner has been
rehabilitated, and (3) the Board determines that the prisoner is a fit
subject for release.2" The legislature granted the Board discretion to
set the prisoner's minimum term, with a few limited exceptions.2' In
essence, the Board could consider general deterrence, retribution, or
rehabilitation criteria when setting a prisoner's minimum term. 22
Before the passage of SHB 1457 the legislature allowed the Board to
parole a mandatory life prisoner if: (1) the prisoner has been continu-
ously confined for a period of twenty consecutive years,23 (2) the
prison warden recommends that the Board parole the prisoner,24 and
16. See In re Whitesel, 111 Wash. 2d 621, 626, 763 P.2d 199, 201 (1988).
17. D. BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON 1-1 (1985).
18. The legislature requires the Board to release a prisoner who has served the maximum
sentence provided by law. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.95.100 (1988).
19. Id. § 9.95.110.
20. Id. § 9.95.100.
21. "Except in those cases wherein the [minimum term] is specifically provided by law ....
the [Board] is not restricted by any of the provisions of chapter 9.95 RCW as to the minimum
duration of confinement .... " 1961-1962 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 128, at 3.
22. Under general deterrence theory, the state punishes an individual on the grounds that
punishment discourages others from committing crimes. See D. BOERNER, supra note 17, §
2.2(b)(2), at 2-16. Under retribution theory, the state punishes an individual because society
believes that the prisoner deserves it. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5, at 25-26
(2d ed. 1986). Under a rehabilitation theory, society punishes prisoners by giving them
appropriate treatment to eliminate their desire to commit crimes. Id § 1.5, at 24.
23. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.115 (1988). The Board may reduce the 20 year
requirement by time earned for good behavior. Id.
24. The parole statute required the warden to base the recommendation on whether the
prisoner's conduct and work had been meritorious. Id. The warden determined whether a
prisoner's conduct and work have been meritorious by requiring the prisoner to participate in a
Mutual Agreement Program (MAP). In re Baker, 44 Wash. App. 116, 117, 720 P.2d 870, 871
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(3) the Board determines that the prisoner is rehabilitated and is a fit
subject for release.25 The Washington Supreme Court referred to this
twenty year requirement as a mandatory minimum term.2 6 Unlike the
statute for paroling non-mandatory prisoners, the legislature did not
require the Board to set a minimum term for mandatory life prisoners.
In addition, the legislature required the Board to set a minimum term
for all prisoners returned to prison for a parole violation.27
B. The Determinate Sentencing System
In response to public dissatisfaction, the Washington Legislature
eliminated the indeterminate sentencing system for persons who com-
mitted crimes after June 1984.28 The public was dissatisfied with this
system for two reasons. First, the public doubted that the indetermi-
nate system rehabilitated prisoners. 29 Second, the public was dissatis-
fied with the wide discrepancies in sentences for prisoners who
committed similar crimes.3" Under Washington's indeterminate sys-
tem, the state gave judges and the Board broad discretion to tailor
sentences to meet the needs of individual prisoners.31 Sentencing dis-
crepancies resulted for a number of reasons. For instance, different
prisoners who committed the same crime required different types of
treatments in order to be rehabilitated.3 2 Furthermore, the state pro-
vided judges and the Board with few objective criteria to make an
otherwise subjective decision.33 Finally, indeterminate sentencing
allowed the experiences and unconscious biases of judges and Board
members to influence the sentencing decisions.34
The legislature designed the SRA to ensure that the punishment for
a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and
(1986). MAP provided that the warden would recommend the prisoner for parole as long as the
prisoner successfully completed specified goals. See Prisoner's Letter, supra note 1 (attached
MAP contract).
25. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.100 (1988).
26. Baker v. Morris, 84 Wash. 2d 804, 805, 529 P.2d 1091, 1092 (1974).
27. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.125 (1988). See also WASHINGTON STATE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE REVIEW BD., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL § 6.420
(1987) [hereinafter POLICY MANUAL].
28. D. BOERNER, supra note 17, at 1-1.
29. Id. § 2.2(b)(2), at 2-12.
30. Id. § 2.2(b)(1), at 2-10, 11.
31. Id. at 1-1.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 2.2(b)(1), at 2-10, 11.
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the offender's criminal history.35 To accomplish this goal, the legisla-
ture developed a sentencing matrix, which assigned presumptive sen-
tencing ranges based on the severity of a prisoner's crime and the
seriousness of the prisoner's criminal history.36 On the vertical axis of
the matrix, the legislature classified the severity of a crime into four-
teen levels.37 On the horizontal axis of the matrix, the legislature
established offender score categories ranging from zero to nine or
more.3" The court calculates an offender score based on the defend-
ant's criminal history.3 9 A prisoner's presumptive sentence range rep-
resents the intersection on the sentencing matrix between the vertical
axis (the seriousness of the offense) and the horizontal axis (the
offender score). The judge has discretion to set a sentence within the
presumptive range.4°
C. The Legislature Attempted To Eliminate Discrepancies Between
the Time Served by Inmates Under the Two Systems
1. The Transition Statute
The transition statute purportedly eliminated the discrepancies
between the time served by inmates under the indeterminate and SRA
systems.41  For non-mandatory prisoners, the transition statute
requires the Board to make minimum term and parole release deci-
sions reasonably consistent with the SRA ranges.42 The transition
statute reduced the discrepancies between the two sentencing systems
by limiting the Board's discretion to set minimum term and parole
release dates. Before the transition statute, the legislature gave the
Board broad discretion to set minimum term and parole release dates
for non-mandatory prisoners.43 The Washington Supreme Court
interpreted the transition statute to limit the Board's discretion to set
minimum terms and parole release dates for non-mandatory prison-
35. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.010(I) (1988); see also State v. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d 384,
393, 655 P.2d 1145, 1151 (1982) ("Punishment is the paramount purpose of the [SRA].").
36. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.310 (1988).
37. Id
38. Id.
39. Id. § 9.94A.330.
40. Id. § 9.94A.120.
41. Before the enactment of SHB 1457, the transition statute applied only to non-mandatory
prisoners. Id § 9.95.009(2). Non-mandatory prisoners welcomed the transition statute because
it reduced the minimum term of these prisoners an average of 32 months. WASHINGTON STATE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE REviEw BD., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 7 (1988).
42. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.009(2) (1988).
43. See D. BOERNER, supra note 17, at 1-1.
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ers.4 In Addleman v. Board of Prison Terms & Parole,45 the court
interpreted the reasonably consistent standard to mean that decisions
outside the SRA ranges should be the exception and not the rule.46
2. SHB 1457
The legislature passed SHB 1457 to ensure that the SRA sentencing
ranges are applied to mandatory life prisoners.47 This amendment
affects mandatory life prisoners in three ways. First, it requires the
Board to set a minimum term for mandatory life prisoners." Second,
it amends the transition statute to require that the Board set the mini-
mum term of mandatory life prisoners reasonably consistent with the
SRA sentencing ranges.49 Third, it eliminates the requirement that
the warden recommend the prisoner for parole.5" The following sec-
tions discuss whether SHB 1457 violates the ex post facto prohibition.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS
The Constitution of the United States prohibits the states from
enacting ex post facto laws. 51 According to the United States Supreme
Court, the framers intended the prohibition to prevent oppressive gov-
ernment conduct and to ensure that people may rely on the laws in
effect when deciding whether to act. 52 The Court has held that a crim-
inal statute53 violates the ex post facto prohibition if it is both retro-
44. See In re Myers, 105 Wash. 2d 257, 262, 714 P.2d 303, 306 (1986).
45. 107 Wash. 2d 503, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986).
46. Id. at 511, 730 P.2d at 1332.
47. 51st Leg., Regular Sess., 1989 Wash. Laws 259 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.95.009, .115 & .0011 (Supp. 1990)).
48. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.116(1) (Supp. 1990).
49. Id. § 9.95.009(2).
50. Id. § 9.95.115.
51. "No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cf. 1.
The Constitution also prohibits the federal government from enacting ex post facto laws. U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The United States Supreme Court interprets the federal and state ex
post facto prohibition in the same manner. Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to What
Constitutes an Ex Post Facto Law Prohibited by Federal Constitution, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1146, 1150
(1978). In addition, the Washington State Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws.
WASHINGTON CONST. art. 1, § 23. The Washington Supreme Court interprets the state's ex post
facto prohibition in the same manner as the United States Supreme Court. See Addleman v.
Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash. 2d 503, 506, 730 P.2d 1327, 1329-30 (1986).
52. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981).
53. The ex post facto prohibition applies only to criminal statutes. Annotation, supra note 51,
at 1150.
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spective 4 and disadvantageous to a prisoner.55 Regardless, the Court
stated that a retrospective statute is not unconstitutional if it only
changes modes of procedures, or if the retrospective statute has an
ameliorating effect. 6
A. When a Retrospective Amendment to a Parole Statute Is
Disadvantageous: The General Rule
A retrospective amendment to a parole statute is disadvantageous to
a prisoner if it reduces the prisoner's opportunity to receive a shorter
prison sentence. 7 In Weaver v. Graham, Florida attempted to retro-
spectively apply an amendment to a gain-time statute.5 8 The amended
statute reduced the number of gain-time days available to prisoners
solely for good behavior.59 The United States Supreme Court held
that the retrospective application of an amended gain-time statute was
disadvantageous to Florida prisoners.' The Court noted that the
amended statute reduced the number of monthly gain-time credits
available to prisoners who obey prison rules and adequately perform
assigned tasks.6 The Court reasoned that the retrospective statute
was disadvantageous to Weaver because it reduced Weaver's opportu-
nity to shorten his time in prison simply by obeying rules and perform-
ing assigned tasks.62
B. Circuit Court Tests To Determine Whether the Retrospective
Application of Allegedly Stricter Parole Criteria Is
Disadvantageous to Prisoners
The United States Supreme Court has held that amendments to
parole statutes that clearly delay a prisoner's opportunity for parole
54. See infra note 93.
55. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987).
56. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977).
57. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). In 1976, Weaver committed a crime in Florida.
Id. at 25. At that time, a Florida statute provided that prisoners may earn gain-time credits for
good conduct. Id. at 26. The gain-time provision allowed prisoners to reduce their prison
sentence by the total amount of gain-time credits earned. Id. The statute provided for a credit of
five days per month for the first two years served, 10 days per month for the third and fourth
year served, and 15 days per month for any remaining years. Id.
In 1978, the Florida Legislature reduced the amount of gain-time credits available for good
conduct. Id The amended statute provided for a gain-time credit of three days per month for
the first two years served, six days per month for the third and fourth year served, and nine days
per month for any remaining years served. Id
58. Id at 27.
59. Id at 26.
60. Id at 35-36.
61. Id. at 33-34.
62. Id.
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are detrimental to a prisoner.6 3  The Court has not determined
whether a retrospective statute violates the ex post facto prohibition
when the statute requires an administrative agency to make parole
decisions using different parole criteria. The circuit courts have ana-
lyzed this problem using various approaches.
1. The Garrison Test
In Marshall v. Garrison, ' the Fourth Circuit compared the practi-
cal operation of the new and old parole statutes to determine whether
the retrospective application of different parole criteria disadvantaged
prisoners.65 When Marshall committed his crime, the federal parole
statute required that the Federal Parole Commission set parole dates
based solely on when the prisoner would be rehabilitated.66 The
amended parole statute required the Federal Parole Commission to
consider the severity of the prisoner's offense.67 The Garrison court
held that the retrospective application of the amended parole statute
violated the ex post facto prohibition.68 The court reasoned that the
retrospective application of the statute was detrimental to Marshall
because it lengthened the period of time Marshall must spend in
prison by making parole more difficult to obtain.69 Parole was more
difficult to obtain because the retrospective statute prescribed that the
Federal Parole Commission consider additional criteria when making
parole decisions.7"
63. Devine v. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 866 F.2d 339, 343 n.7 (10th Cir. 1989)
(citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981)).
64. 659 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1981). Decisions in other circuits suggest that the ex post facto
prohibition could be used to invalidate a statute that delayed a prisoner's opportunity for parole.
See, e.g., Benites v. United States Parole Comm'n, 595 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1979); Love v.
Fitzharris, 460 F.2d 382, 384-85 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 1100 (1973).
65. Marshall, 659 F.2d at 442.
66. Id. at 443.
67. In 1973, the court sentenced Marshall to 15 years in prison after he pleaded guilty to
various crimes. Id. at 441. Because Marshall was a minor, the court sentenced him under the
Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA). Id. In 1976, Congress amended the FYCA to require
the Parole Commission to consider "factors of general deterrence and retribution" when making
parole decisions for persons sentenced under the FYCA. Id. at 443. In 1979, the Federal Parole
Commission set Marshall's parole date for January 1983. Id. at 441. The Commission based the
decision on three factors, one of which was the severity of the crimes to which Marshall pleaded
guilty. Id.
68. Id. at 444.
69. Id. at 445.
70. Id.
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2. The Heirens Test
In Heirens v. Mizell,71 the Seventh Circuit compared the practical
operation of a new parole statute to administrative guidelines issued
under the old parole statute to determine if a change in a parole statute
was disadvantageous to a prisoner."2 When Heirens committed his
crimes, the Illinois parole statute did not require the Parole Board to
consider any specific criteria when making parole decisions.73 In
1972, the Illinois Legislature enacted a new parole statute that prohib-
ited the Parole Board from paroling a prisoner if it determined that
any one of three criteria existed.74 Heirens objected when the Parole
Board denied him parole based solely on the second criterion. 75 The
Heirens court held that the retrospective application of the new parole
statute did not violate the ex post facto prohibition.7 ' Despite the dif-
ferences between the new and old parole statutes, the court reasoned
that the new parole statute was not disadvantageous to Heirens
because it only codified the Parole Board's prior practice and
procedure.77
C. Certain Procedural Changes in Criminal Statutes Are Not
Disadvantageous to Prisoners
In Paschal v. Wainwright,78 the Eleventh Circuit held that the retro-
spective application of a criminal statute is not disadvantageous to
prisoners when the change in law is procedural and does not affect
substantive matters.79 When Paschal committed his crime, Florida's
parole statute allowed the Parole Commission to consider a prisoner
for parole at any time. ° In 1978, the Florida Legislature amended its
parole statute to require that the Parole Commission develop objective
71. 729 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 842 (1984). Only the Seventh Circuit has
followed the Heirens holding. See, eg., Taylor v. Taylor, 595 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
72. Heirens, 729 F.2d at 459.
73. Id. at 460.
74. The new parole statute prohibited the Parole Board from releasing a prisoner if- (1) a
substantial risk exists that the prisoner will violate parole conditions, (2) releasing the prisoner
would deprecate the seriousness of the crime, or (3) releasing the prisoner would have a
substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline. Id
75. Id. at 452. Under the second criteria, the Parole Board could not parole a prisoner if "his
release at that time would deprecate the seriousness of his offense." Id at 457.
76. Id. at 463.
77. Id.
78. 738 F.2d 1173 (lth Cir. 1984); see also Johnson v. Wainright, 772 F.2d 826 (11th Cir.
1985).
79. Paschal, 738 F.2d at 1176.
80. Id. at 1175. The Parole Commission considered Paschal for parole six times between the
years 1974 and 1979. Iad at 1174-75.
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parole guidelines."1 After the amendment, the Parole Commission
used the guidelines to set Paschal's presumptive release date for March
1993.82 Paschal argued that the retrospective application of the guide-
lines disadvantaged him because it prevented the Parole Commission
from considering him for parole at any time. 3 The Paschal court held
that the amended parole statute was not disadvantageous to Paschal
because the change was procedural and served only to clarify the exer-
cise of administrative discretion. 4 The court had two justifications for
its decision. First, the court reasoned that the amendments to the
parole statute were procedural because they did not require the Parole
Board to make parole decisions using different criteria.8 5 Second, the
court reasoned that the changes were procedural because they did not
limit the discretion of the Parole Commission to grant parole.86
D. The Ameliorating Effects Test
Even if a particular change in a statute is disadvantageous, the ame-
liorating effects test requires a court to compare the old and new stat-
utes in toto to determine if the new statute may be fairly characterized
as more onerous.87 When a court applies this test, the court does not
consider an effect ameliorating unless it compensates for the harm
caused by the new statute. In Weaver v. Graham,8 the United States
Supreme Court held that the retrospective application of a new gain-
time statute was detrimental to prisoners because it reduced the pris-
oners' opportunity to shorten their time in prison simply by obeying
rules.8 9 The Court rejected Florida's argument that the new statute
was not disadvantageous to prisoners because it provided additional
opportunities for the prisoners to obtain gain-time credits.90 Instead,
the Court reasoned that the new gain-time provisions did not have an
81. Id. at 1175. These guidelines created presumptive parole release dates based on the
seriousness of the offense committed and the likelihood of a favorable parole outcome. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1179.
85. Id. at 1178. Though the new parole statute required the Parole Board to place primary
weight on two of the former parole criteria, it appears that the Parole Board still had discretion
to make parole decisions based on any of the former criteria.
86. Id.
87. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977).
88. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
89. Id. at 33-34.
90. Id. at 34-35. The new statute provided that a prisoner may receive additional gain-time
credit if the prisoner satisfies both the good-conduct requirement and special gain-time category
requirements. Id. at 34 n.18.
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ameliorating effect because prisoners were not compensated for the
reductions of gain-time available solely for good conduct.91
III. SHB 1457 VIOLATES THE EX POST FACTO
PROHIBITION
SHB 1457 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it is both
retrospective and disadvantageous to mandatory life prisoners.92
Because SHB 1457 is clearly retrospective,93 this section examines two
possible theories under which this amendment may be disadvanta-
geous to mandatory life prisoners. First, SHB 1457 may be disadvan-
tageous because it requires the Board to set minimum terms for
mandatory life prisoners. This analysis, however, applies only to
mandatory life prisoners whom the Board has not paroled. The parole
statute always required the Board to set minimum terms for
mandatory life prisoners whom the Board returned to prison after a
parole violation.94 Second, it may be disadvantageous because it
changes the criteria by which the Board sets minimum terms. In addi-
tion, this section examines whether SHB 1457 is merely a procedural
change which does not effect matters of substance. Finally, this sec-
tion examines whether this amendment has any ameliorating effects.
A. Requiring the Board To Set Minimum Terms for Mandatory
Life Prisoners Is Disadvantageous to These Prisoners
SHB 1457 is disadvantageous to mandatory life prisoners because it
requires the Board to set new minimum terms for them. In Weaver v.
Graham,95 the United States Supreme Court held that a retrospective
gain-time statute was disadvantageous to prisoners because it reduced
the opportunity of these prisoners to receive a shorter prison sen-
tence.96 The Court reasoned that the retrospective gain-time statute
limited the prisoner's opportunity to receive a shorter prison sentence
91. Id. at 35.
92. Id. at 28-29.
93. A sentencing statute is retrospective if it applies to prisoners convicted of acts committed
before the statute's effective date. Id. at 31. Because SHB 1457 is retrospective, this Comment
will only briefly discuss this issue. The legislature enacted SHB 1457 in 1989. See Substitute
House Bill 1457, 51st Leg., Regular Sess., 1989 Wash. Laws 259 (codified at WAsH. Rav. CODE
ANN. § 9.95.009, .115 & .0011 (Supp. 1990)). This amendment applies to prisoners who were
sentenced to a mandatory life sentence for crimes' committed before July 1984. WAsH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.95.009(2) (Supp. 1990). SHB 1457 is retrospective because it applies to
prisoners convicted for crimes committed before the amendment's effective date.
94. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.95.125 (1988).
95. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
96. Id. at 33-35.
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because it reduced the number of gain-time days available to prisoners
solely for good behavior.9 7 Likewise, SHB 1457 is disadvantageous to
mandatory life prisoners because it reduces their opportunity to
receive a shorter prison sentence. Alan's story illustrates this point.9"
Before the passage of this amendment, the Board informed Alan that
it would consider him for parole in February 1990. This date repre-
sented the end of the statutorily mandated minimum term of twenty
years, less time earned for good behavior. As required by SHB 1457,
the Board now must set a new minimum term for Alan. Under this
new minimum term, the Board will not consider him for parole until
1996. In effect, Alan will have to wait an additional six years before
the Board will consider him for parole. Under the pre-SRA system,
the Board might have paroled him at any time between 1990 and
1996." 9 Therefore, SHB 1457 is disadvantageous to mandatory life
prisoners.
B. SHB 1457 Is Disadvantageous to Mandatory Life Prisoners
Because It Restricts the Criteria the Board May Use To Set
Minimum Terms
1. SHB 1457 Fails the Garrison Test
SHB 1457 is adverse to mandatory life prisoners because the practi-
cal effect of this amendment is to prevent the Board from setting a
minimum term based on its estimate of the earliest possible date the
prisoner will be rehabilitated. When examining whether a change in
parole criteria was disadvantageous to prisoners, the Fourth Circuit in
Marshall v. Garrison compared the practical operation of new and old
parole statutes to determine whether the retrospective application of
different criteria disadvantaged prisoners."° The Garrison court con-
cluded that the retrospective application of the new parole criteria was
disadvantageous to the prisoner because it increased the period of time
97. Id.
98. See supra note I and accompanying text.
99. The Board reported to the legislature that SHB 1457 would have the practical effect of
delaying the opportunity of mandatory life prisoners to be paroled. See 1989 ISRB STUDY, supra
note 8, at 8. The Board noted that under the old indeterminate system mandatory life prisoners
received an automatic 20 year minimum term. Id. Though the minimum term is set at 20 years,
a prisoner's first opportunity for a parole review is at 13 years and four months, assuming that
the prisoner obtains all the available gain-time credit. Id. Under the SRA sentencing ranges, the
Board noted that a mandatory life prisoner without a criminal history would receive a minimum
term with the low end at 20 years. Id. Because most of these prisoners have a criminal history,
the Board stated that most mandatory life prisoners would receive a minimum term well over 20
years. Id. Despite this fact, the Board recommended that the legislature amend the transition
statute to include mandatory life prisoners. Id.
100. Marshall v. Garrison, 659 F.2d 440, 442 (4th Cir. 1981).
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the inmate must spend in prison by making parole more difficult to
obtain. 101
Similarly, SHB 1457 will lengthen the period of time mandatory life
prisoners must spend in prison by limiting the criteria by which the
Board may set minimum terms. Before the passage of SHB 1457 and
except as specifically provided for by law, the parole statute allowed
the Board to set minimum terms based on general deterrence, retribu-
tion, or rehabilitation criteria. 0 2 Under the transition statute, the leg-
islature required the Board to set the minimum terms of mandatory
life prisoners reasonably consistent with the SRA sentencing ranges. 10 3
Yet the legislature designed the SRA sentencing ranges to punish pris-
oners, which means that it considers only a retribution criterion."
By requiring the Board to set minimum terms reasonably consistent
with the SRA sentencing ranges, the legislature prevents the Board
from setting a minimum term based on the earliest possible date the
prisoner could have been rehabilitated. Because a minimum term
based on a rehabilitation criterion may be less than a minimum term
set reasonably consistent with the SRA, the practical effect of SHB
1457 is to increase prisoners' sentences by delaying their opportunity
for parole. Consequently, SHB 1457 is disadvantageous to mandatory
life prisoners because it makes parole more difficult to obtain.105
In addition, SHB 1457 is disadvantageous to mandatory life prison-
ers because it requires the prisoner to satisfy the requirements of both
the indeterminate and determinate sentencing system. Before the pas-
sage of SHB 1457, the Board could consider a mandatory life prisoner
for parole after the prisoner had served the mandatory minimum term
of twenty years.10 6 SHB 1457 amends the transition statute to require
the Board to set the minimum term of a mandatory life prisoner rea-
sonably consistent with the SRA sentencing ranges. 10 7 Because mini-
mum term decisions outside the SRA sentencing ranges are the
exception,'0 8 the state is requiring mandatory life prisoners to satisfy
the sentencing requirements of the SRA before the Board will even
101. IM. at 445.
102. See 1961-1962 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 128, at 3.
103. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
105. A mandatory life prisoner is not required to show that the Board would have considered
rehabilitation when it set the prisoner's minimum term. The Supreme Court has held that an
increase in the possible sentence a prisoner must serve is an ex post facto violation. Lindsey v.
Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937).
106. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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consider them for parole. Yet the transition statute does not require
the Board to set parole release dates of mandatory life prisoners rea-
sonably consistent with the SRA.t" The Board sets the parole release
date for mandatory life prisoners based on whether the prisoner is
rehabilitated, without reference to the SRA sentencing ranges. 10
SHB 1457 has the practical effect of requiring mandatory life prisoners
to satisfy the full sentencing requirements of both the indeterminate
and SRA sentencing systems.
Requiring the prisoner to satisfy the requirements of both sentenc-
ing systems is disadvantageous because it will either increase or have
no effect on the length of time a mandatory life prisoner spends in
prison. SHB 1457 would increase the prison sentence of a mandatory
life prisoner if the Board would have paroled the prisoner except for
the fact that the prisoner's minimum term is now reasonably consis-
tent with the SRA ranges. This amendment would have no effect on
the prisoner's sentence if the Board would have refused the prisoner
parole even after the expiration of the prisoner's new minimum term.
In either case, this amendment will never result in a mandatory life
prisoner receiving a shorter sentence. Therefore, SHB 1457 violates
the ex post facto prohibition.
2. The Seventh Circuit Approach: The Heirens Test
a. The Court Should Not Apply the Heirens Test
Washington courts should not use the Heirens test because it is
inconsistent with the theory of the ex post facto prohibition. In
Heirens v. Mizell, "' the Seventh Circuit compared the parole criteria
under a new statute with administrative guidelines issued under the
old statute." 2 The Heirens court held that the retrospective applica-
tion of facially different parole statutes was not disadvantageous to
prisoners. 1 3 The court reasoned that the new parole statute did not
109. As amended by SHB 1457, the transition statute applies differently to non-mandatory
prisoners and mandatory life prisoners. For non-mandatory prisoners, the transition statute
requires the Board to set both the minimum term and parole release dates reasonably consistent
with the SRA sentencing ranges. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.009(2) (Supp. 1990). For
mandatory life prisoners, the transition statute only requires the Board to set the minimum term
reasonably consistent with the SRA ranges. Id.
110. The Board did not want the parole release decisions of mandatory life prisoners to be
subject to the transition statute. 1989 ISRB STUDY, supra note 8, at 7. The Board wanted to
retain plenary authority to deny these prisoners parole because it considers these prisoners the
state's most serious, violent and dangerous felony offenders. Id. at 2, 7.
111. 729 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 842 (1984).
112. Id. at 459.
113. Id.
242
Vol. 66:229, 1991
Ex Post Facto Violation
violate the ex post facto prohibition because it merely codified the
Parole Board's administrative practice.' There are many reasons,
however, why a court should not consider administrative guidelines
when reviewing a law for an ex post facto infirmity. First, a substan-
tive difference exists between a statute and administrative guide-
lines." 5 Although an agency is required to comply with the
requirements of a statute, it may ignore or modify its own guide-
lines . ' 6 Second, the framers intended the ex post facto prohibition to
prevent legislative abuses." 7 The legislature may intimidate a broad
range of people who oppose certain economic and social policies by
passing retrospective penal statutes. The ex post facto prohibition pre-
vents this abusive behavior. An administrative agency, however, may
not intimidate a broad range of people because an agency's power is
limited by statute."' Furthermore, though an agency may target a
person or corporation that falls within its power, the legislature or
courts may always intercede on behalf of the complaining party. 119
Finally, the ex post facto analysis should not be extended to adminis-
trative guidelines because it would discourage the agency from draft-
ing formal guidelines. 120 In order to avoid potential litigation, the
agency might make parole decisions based solely on general standards
articulated in the sentencing statute. Yet decisions made without ref-
erence to specific criteria create the potential for arbitrary and capri-
cious actions. Without detailed guidelines, a prisoner would have
difficulty showing that a parole decision was the product of impermis-
sible considerations. Therefore, Washington courts should not apply
the Heirens test because policy considerations dictate that an ex post
facto analysis should not consider administrative guidelines.
114. Id. The Seventh Circuit has suggested that Heirens is poorly reasoned. See Prater v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 963 (7th Cir. 1986) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
115. Annotation, United States Parole Commission Guidelines for Federal Prisoners, 61
A.L.R. FED. 135, 156-59 (1983).
116. See Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); see also Ruip v. United States, 555 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1977)
(noting that guidelines do not have the characteristics of law, being flexible rather than fixed and
rigid).
117. In Calder v. Bull, Justice Chase noted that the ex post facto prohibition "very probably
arose from the knowledge, that the Parliament of Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to
pass such laws .... With very few exceptions, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by
ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice." 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386, 389 (1798).
118. See W. Fox, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 17 (1986).
119. Id. at § 9-10.
120. Prater v. United States Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 1986).
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b. Even Under the Heirens Test, SHB 1457 Is Still
Disadvantageous to Mandatory Life Prisoners
Even if a Washington court uses the Heirens test, SHB 1457 is dis-
advantageous to mandatory life prisoners because the amended transi-
tion statute does not codify the Board's previous guidelines. First, the
former parole guidelines stated that the Board does not fix minimum
terms for mandatory life prisoners.121 SHB 1457, however, requires
the Board to set a minimum term for mandatory life prisoners. '22 Sec-
ond, under the Board's former guidelines, the Board had broad discre-
tion to consider many factors when setting a prisoner's minimum
term. 2 3 These guidelines stated that the Board sets minimum terms
based on the prisoner's behavior in criminal acts leading to the current
incarceration, and the prisoner's record of criminal convictions and
parole revocations. 24 In addition, the Board had the authority to dis-
regard the guidelines provided that it gave written reasons for such
decisions. 125 The guidelines provide examples of when the Board may
use its discretion to reduce a minimum term, such as when a prisoner
makes substantial progress toward being rehabilitated.' 26 Neverthe-
less, SHB 1457 requires that the Board set the minimum terms of
mandatory life prisoners reasonably consistent with the SRA sentenc-
ing ranges.'2 7 Consequently, SHB 1457 does not codify the Board's
prior guidelines because the SRA sentencing ranges exclude rehabilita-
tion as a criteria for making minimum term decisions.
3. Procedural Changes in Parole Statutes: The Paschal Test
SHB 1457 is a substantive change in the parole statute because it
alters the criteria under which the Board makes parole decisions.
SHB 1457 is distinguishable from Paschal v. Wainright, 121 where the
Eleventh Circuit held that a retrospective application of a criminal
statute was not disadvantageous to prisoners when the change in law
121. POLICY MANUAL, supra note 27, § 2.050. The former parole guidelines, however,
required the Board to set minimum terms for mandatory life prisoners who were returned to
prison because of parole violations. Id. § 6.420.
122. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.116(1) (Supp. 1990).
123. WASHINGTON STATE BOARD OF PRISON TERMS AND PAROLES, GUIDELINES FOR
FIXING OF MINIMUM TERMS AND RECONSIDERATION OF LENGTH OF CONFINEMENT 1 (1983).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SECTION, WASHINGTON STATE BD. OF PRISON TERMS
AND PAROLES, REASONS FOR OUTSIDE GUIDELINE DECISIONS (1980) (reason No. 22).
127. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
128. 738 F.2d 1173 (1lth Cir. 1984).
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did not affect matters of substance. 129 The court reasoned that the
change in law was procedural because it did not require the Parole
Commission to use different criteria when making parole decisions,
and because it did not limit the Board's discretion to make parole deci-
sions. 130 In contrast, SHB 1457 affects substantive matters. First, the
Board must now make minimum term decisions reasonably consistent
with the SRA sentencing ranges. This amendment requires the Board
to use different parole criteria when making parole decisions.13 1 Sec-
ond, the Washington Supreme Court held that the transition statute
limits the Board's discretion to set minimum terms. 132 Under the
transition statute, the court stated that Board decisions falling outside
the SRA ranges should be the exception and not the rule.133
4. The Ameliorating Effects Test
Eliminating the warden certification requirement does not qualify as
an ameliorating effect because it does not compensate mandatory life
prisoners for the harm caused by SHB'1457. In Weaver v. Graham, 134
the United States Supreme Court compared an old and new gain-time
statute in toto to determine if the new statute may be fairly character-
ized as more onerous.135 Though the new gain-time statute provided
additional ways to earn gain-time, the Court held that these new gain-
time provisions did not qualify as an ameliorating effect because they
did not compensate for the reduction of gain-time available solely for
good conduct. 13
6
Likewise, the elimination of the certification requirement does not
qualify as an ameliorating effect because it does not compensate
mandatory life prisoners f6r the harm caused by the new minimum
term requirement. SHB 1457 delays the opportunity of a mandatory
life prisoner to be considered for parole by requiring the Board to set
minimum terms for these prisoners, 137 and by requiring the Board to
set minimum terms reasonably consistent with the SRA sentencing
ranges. 13 8 Because the length of the delay depends on the application
129. Ha. at 1176.
130. IM at 1178.
131. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
132. In re Myers, 105 Wash. 2d 257, 262, 714 P.2d 303, 306 (1986).
133. Addleman v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash. 2d 503, 511, 730 P.2d 1327,
1332 (1986).
134. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
135. Id at 30-31.
136. Id. at 35-36.
137. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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of the SRA sentencing ranges, mandatory life prisoners have no
opportunity to shorten their new minimum term. Yet the mandatory
life prisoner could influence whether the warden recommended the
prisoner for parole. Alan's story illustrates this point. Before the pas-
sage of SHB 1457, Alan participated in the MAP program.13 9 In
Alan's agreement, the Department of Corrections stated that it would
recommend Alan for parole upon his successful completion of speci-
fied objectives."4 The agreement required Alan to satisfy the objec-
tives one year before the expiration of his twenty year minimum
term. 141 In essence, Alan determined whether the warden would rec-
ommend him for parole. Nevertheless, Alan's agreement became use-
less when the legislature eliminated the certification requirement. The
elimination of the certification requirement does not compensate for
the harm caused by this amendment because prisoners like Alan have
no opportunity to reduce the newly set minimum terms.
IV. CONCLUSION
Washington courts should hold that SHB 1457 violates the constitu-
tional prohibition against ex post facto laws. SHB 1457 violates the ex
post facto prohibition because it is both retrospective and disadvanta-
geous to prisoners. In addition, SHB 1457 is not a procedural change
in the law, and it does not have any ameliorating effects. Because
applying SRA sentencing ranges to mandatory life prisoners is uncon-
stitutional, Washington State should allow these prisoners to serve
their sentences as required by the parole statute in effect when they
committed their respective crimes. The legislature always has the
power to reduce a prisoner's sentence. The legislature, however,
clearly lacks the power to increase the sentences of mandatory life
prisoners by delaying their opportunity for parole. Any other result is
simply unfair.
Steven J. Samario
139. See Prisoner's Letter, supra note 1 (attached MAP contract).
140. See supra note 24 (discussing MAP).
141. Alan's agreement stated that Alan must satisfy the objectives by March 1989. See
Prisoner's Letter, supra note I (attached MAP contract). Alan's minimum term expired
February 1990. Id. The agreement does not indicate whether Alan satisfied the objectives. Id.
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